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Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking in Interdependent Networked Game
Qing Jin and Zhen Wang∗
School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
Spatial evolution game has traditionally assumed that players interact with neighbors on a single network,
which is isolated and not influenced by other systems. We introduce the simple game model into the interde-
pendent networks composed of two networks, and show that when the interdependent factor α is smaller than a
particular value αC , homogeneous cooperation can be guaranteed. However, as interdependent factor exceeds
αC , spontaneous symmetry breaking of fraction of cooperators presents itself between different networks. In
addition, our results can be well predicted by the strategy-couple pair approximation method.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
It is widely recognized that cooperation is essential for the
social and natural evolution. To support this issue, spatial
structure plays a significant role in leading the emergence of
cooperation via applying the social dilemma game [1]. How-
ever, most of these studies are implemented on a single net-
work which ignores several particular intimacies between so-
cial members in the real life, such as married couples or par-
ents and children. In order to exactly delineate the real situa-
tions in the life some more sophisticated paradigms need to be
presented, which could distinguish between the intimate and
common relationships among people.
Recently, the property and function of interdependent net-
works regarding catastrophic cascade of failures have been in-
vestigated by Buldyrev et al. [2]. Rather than considering
the catastrophic events on a single network, they provide the
model on two interdependent networks where nodes on net-
work A depend on network B, and vice versa [3]. They find
that the interdependent networks are more vulnerable to ran-
dom failures if they have broader degree distributions, which
is contrary to the situation for one single network. The model
of interdependent networks, in our views, becomes a perfect
candidate to describe various types of human interactions. To
be concrete, a player (a node) playing social dilemma game
with his neighbors represents common relationship among hu-
man being, and the relation between him and his companion
on the other network characterizes the specific intimate rela-
tionship like husband and wife, or father and son. In such
a case, the player’s decision is not simply dependent on his
own payoff during the game but also relevant to his compan-
ion’s situation. In this sense, the model provides a more realis-
tic description of cooperation phenomenon by considering the
combined effect of two of Nowak’s cooperation mechanisms:
network reciprocity and kin selection [4].
In this Letter, we will perform the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game (PDG), one of the most powerful models in study-
ing cooperation phenomenon, on the interdependent networks
(which are composed of Network Up and Network Down, see
the Appendix). To control the intimacy between nodes from
two networks, an interdependent factor α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is pro-
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posed: in the limit α→0 two networks are refereed as weak
interdependency; in the limit α→1 strong interdependency
between networks will occur. We will show that, when α is
smaller than a particular value αC , cooperation is highly pro-
moted by setting a larger α and the distribution of cooperators
is homogeneous, which will be discussed below. However,
when α exceeds αC , a spontaneous symmetry breaking be-
tween the fraction of cooperators on different networks can
be observed. In order to analyze and explain these phenom-
ena, we also extend the traditional pair approximation and
give out the strategy-couple pair approximation (SCPA, see
the Appendix).
As for the game, we will follow the Nowak-May frame-
work, the so-called weak prisoner’s dilemma game [5]. Two
players have a choice between two pure strategies, coopera-
tors C and defectors D. The payoffs are given by the follow-
ing matrix:
C D
C
D
(
R S
T P
) (1)
R=1 is the reward for mutual cooperation, T=b is tempta-
tion to defect, S=0 is the sucker’s payoff and P=0 is the
punishment for mutual defection, whereby 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 en-
sures a proper payoff ranking. In order to better character-
ize the influence about the interdependency of the networks,
we choose the homogeneous network, including L × L regu-
lar lattices with periodic conditions and the small-world (SW)
networks, since it is well-known that heterogeneous networks
(such as scale-free network) would highly enhance coopera-
tion in PDG [6]. Additionally, the interdependent networks
also need to be point-to-point, which means every node in one
network will have only one companion on the other network.
Each player located on the networks is initially designated
to use either strategy C or D and acquires the payoff by play-
ing the game with all his neighbors. Subsequently, one ran-
domly chosen player i selects one of his neighbors j with
equal probability, and adopts his strategy based on the Fermi
Rule [7]:
W (i→ j) = f(Gj −Gi) = [1 + exp(−(Gj −Gi)/K)]
−1(2)
where K represents the amplitude of noise (we simply fix K
to be 0.1 in this work ), and Gi denotes the fitness of player i,
2FIG. 1: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρ as a function b for
different values of α when Monte Carlo simulations (a) are imple-
mented. Note that if b is larger than 1 (marked by the red arrows),
faction of cooperators will enhance with the increment of α. When
α exceeds a specific value αC (αC ≈0.5), the symmetry breaking
phenomenon will appear. In addition, our strategy-couple pair ap-
proximation approach (b) correctly predicts the trends.
considering both its own payoff Pi and the payoff of its com-
panion P ′i . Of particular interest, the fitness Gi can be quanti-
tatively evaluated in the following wayGi=(1−α)∗Pi+α∗P
′
i .
Here 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 represents the interdependent factor. If α=0
then the player’s fitness is equal to its own payoff, and the
model gets back to the original spatial PDG [8]. If α=1 then
the fitness of a node will be totally determined by his compan-
ion’s situation on the other network.
Results of Monte Carlo simulations presented below are ob-
tained typically for the size L=100 to 400, but when we deal
with the phase transition points, a large size (L=1000) will be
adopted to assure the exactness of simulations. In a full Monte
Carlo step (MCS) each players has a chance to adopt the strat-
egy from one of their neighbors once on average. Moreover,
the key quantity fraction of cooperators ρ is determined with
the last 104 full steps of overall 5 × 105 MCS, and the final
data results from an average over 20 independent realizations.
Figure 1 shows the simulation and analysis results about
how fraction of cooperators ρ varies as a function of b for dif-
ferent values of interdependent factor α. To give a clear illus-
tration, the value of ρ is also provided when b is smaller than
1. As evidenced in the figure, we can observe two types of be-
haviors within the system: symmetry breaking phenomenon
and phase transition. When α is smaller than a particular value
αC (αC≈0.5 in the present model), the fraction of cooperators
will be completely equal on two networks. At the same time,
it is worth emphasizing that with increasing interdependent
factor α cooperation can be better enhanced, which, to large
extent, attributes to the self-organization ofC-C coupled clus-
ters, as we will discuss in what follows. However, when α
exceeds αC the spontaneous symmetry breaking will emerge,
namely, fraction of cooperators on two networks are different.
In some particular regions (where b is slightly larger than 1),
all the players on one of the networks will uniformly choose
the strategy C. With further raising the temptation to defec-
tion, the symmetry of the system will be gradually regained.
In fact, the larger the value of α, the more visible the symme-
try breaking phenomenon. Moreover, Fig. 1(b) features the
results of our SCPA approach (see the Appendix), which can
correctly predict the trends. Because this analytical approach
is unable to adequately provide the threshold value of cooper-
ation (where the phase transition between mixed C+D phase
and pureD phase occurs), we simply show the results with re-
stricting b between 0.95 and 1.10. From Fig. 1(b), we can see
that SCPA method can perfectly predict the enhancement of
cooperation when the larger α is considered, and it also quali-
tatively show us the emergence of the spontaneous symmetry
breaking phenomenon [9].
In order to scrutinize the phase transition of system, now we
turn to the phase diagrams under different cases. Fig. 2(a) is
the phase diagram of α=0.4, which displays the existence of
three phases: pure cooperators phase (PC), mixed strategies
phase (MS) and pure defectors phase (PD), as was previously
reported in the original PGD [8]. However, in Fig. 2(b), where
α is set as 0.9 that is larger than αC , a novel phase emerges:
the symmetry breaking phase (SB). In this phase, usually with
one of the networks showing a pure-cooperation behavior, two
networks do not share the same fraction of cooperators. The
discovery of this interesting phase not only answers the ques-
tion of why pure-cooperation can be found in human society,
but also provides a key to the problem about the coexistence of
pure-cooperation and quasi-cooperation in different aspects of
our daily life. These seem reasonable and are easily justifiable
with realistic examples. For example, when dealing with the
commercial and military problems, we do not always choose
cooperation as the strategy [1]. Whereas a pure-cooperation
behavior is also ubiquitous in other aspects of natural and so-
cial lives, such as, the educational or academic events, collec-
tive behavior of ants or bees [4], where each member never
3FIG. 2: (Color online) Phase diagrams for α=0.4 (a) and α=0.9 (b) on the interdependent regular lattices (green squares) and small-world
(SW) networks (red triangles) with fraction of rewired links equalling 0.05. The colored regions represent different phases: yellow is pure
cooperators phase (PC), cyan is mixed strategies phase (MS), gray is pure defectors phase (PD) and purple is symmetry breaking phase (SB).
Additionally, the lines in (c) denote the results of strategy-couple pair approximation (SCPA) for α=0.9, which is qualitatively similar to the
case of (b). The dashed line is an unstable solution of SCPA approach.
FIG. 3: (Color online) Time evolution of different strategy couples
for α=0.4 (a) and α=0.9 (b). About the meanings of couples, we
can give a simple example. For instance, C-D means that the player
on network Up chooses C and the interdependent player on network
Down chooses D (parameter: b=1.005).
betrays their groups, and the strength of society lies in the
individual loyalty. We argue that if no additional rule is intro-
duced, this pure-cooperation phenomenon goes beyond what
can be supported by the traditional spatial reciprocity [10].
Moreover, it will be instructive to check the universality of
this interesting behavior on other networks. From the pre-
sented results in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b), we find that the in-
terdependent regular lattices (RL) and small-world (SW) net-
works actually share the same phase diagrams, implying that
this behavior is robust to different coupled networks.
Importantly, the intriguing symmetry breaking phase can
also be obtained by applying the SCPA approach (see Fig.
2(c)). Instead of the second phase transition in the simulation
results (Fig. 2(b)), SCPA shows a first order phase transition,
namely, it cannot provide the exact type of phase transition.
The reason of this shortage is that SCPA only considers two
couples’ interaction within the system, and neglects the long-
range interaction among players on the networks, which actu-
ally plays an important role in the phase transition. However,
the flaw would not affect the prediction of SCPA about the
system’s behavior, such as, showing us the symmetry break-
FIG. 4: (Color online) Evolution patterns of different couples for
α=0.4 (upper panel) and α=0.9 (bottom panel). The color code of
strategy couples is the same as Fig. 3, namely, C-C blue,C-D green,
D-C yellow and D-D red. From left to right the specific steps are 0,
10, 200, 2000, and 30000 for both panels (parameter: b=1.005).
ing phase. We also need to mention that there exists an unsta-
ble solution of the SCPA equations in the symmetry breaking
phase (denoted by the dashed line), the details and equations
of SCPA will be stated in the Appendix.
Subsequently, we proceed with examining the time evolu-
tion for four types of strategy couples: C-C, C-D, D-C and
D-D couples. Figure 3 features the results obtained for α=0.4
(a) and α=0.9 (b), and the relevant evolution patterns are illus-
trated in Fig. 4. It is obvious that, in the very early stages of
evolution process (note that fractions are recorded in between
full steps), D-D couples thrive. Quite surprisingly though,
the tide changes fast, namely, D-D couples become the rarest
ones, and their dominant space is replaced by C-C couples.
However, in the next thousands of steps, the situations will be-
come different within two systems (see Fig. 3). For α=0.4 the
system will reach the thermodynamic equilibrium state very
quickly. When α=0.9 is taken into account, an intriguing phe-
nomenon appears: instead of reaching the equilibrium state,
clusters of C-C, C-D and D-C couples are gradually self-
organized. In order to visually inspect this behavior, let us
focus on the evolution patterns (see the bottom panel of Fig.
4). Initially, several sporadic clusters of C-C, C-D and D-
C couples exist in the system, but soon they will combine to
4FIG. 5: (Color online) Fraction distributions of strategy couples for
different value of α when simulation (a) and SCPA approach (b) are
implemented. Simultaneously, we also show the spatial patterns in
(c), where the color code is the same as Fig. 4 (parameter: b=1.005).
form larger clusters. Informed from the SCPA results (see
Fig. 2(c)), we see that the present pattern is probably unsta-
ble, which means that till now the system merely reaches a
semi-equilibrium state and it cannot survive from little pertur-
bations. Interestingly, this prediction comes true in the next
steps: one type of the clusters dies out at last and only two
kinds of them survive, which results in the spontaneous sym-
metry breaking of the networks since the fractions ofC-D and
D-C are not equal any more. The C-C couples will remain in
the system while the survival ofC-D orD-C couples depends
on the perturbations.
Finally, it remains of interest to elucidate why cooperation
can be improved with the increment of α. To provide answers,
we study the fraction distributions of strategy couples in Fig.
5. What firstly attracts our attention is the fact the larger the
value of α is, the more C-C couples exist. Actually, as in-
creasing α, there will be more C-D, D-C and D-D couples
switching to C-C couples (in the process, D-D couples will
first transform to C-D or D-C couples, then to C-C couples).
In addition, Fig. 4(c) shows the spatial patterns for different
α, whereby for α=0 only a few sporadic C-C couple clusters
exist which comes from the occasional superposition of co-
operators’ clusters on both networks, since the networks are
actually non-relevant in such a situation. However, when a
larger α is considered (α=0.2), more C-C couples will be
connected to each other in order to build solid clusters pro-
tecting themselves against the exploitation by defectors [6–8].
When α equals to 0.4 (close to the symmetry breaking value
αC ), C-C couples strongly bond to each other, thereby much
largerC-C coupled clusters will be constructed in the system,
which shows us a C-C couples’ ocean. At the same time, the
C-D and and D-C couples sporadically exist through form-
ing small clusters and D-D couples can only survive along
the edges of these small mixture strategy coupled clusters.
To conclude, we have introduced the interdependent net-
works into spatial game study. Through systematic simula-
tions, we have demonstrated that the interdependency between
different networks have a great influence on the cooperative
behavior. When the interdependent factor α exceeds a partic-
ular value αC , the spontaneous symmetry breaking between
the fraction of cooperators will appear. If it is smaller than
αC , homogeneous fraction is able to be observed in the sys-
tem and the fraction will increase with the increment of α.
Besides, these phenomena could be well predicted and ana-
lyzed by our strategy-couple pair approximation method.
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Appendix: Strategy-Couple Pair Approximation Method
Qing Jin and Zhen Wang∗
School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
Before formal characterization of analysis method, it is very necessary to illustrate the structure of interdependent networks.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we only consider the case that interdependent networks are composed of two
networks, Network Up and Network Down, both with the equivalent nodes (see Fig. A1). On each network nodes directly
interact with their neighbors, as was previously depicted on the traditional network [1–7]. More importantly, the functioning of
a node on one network also depends on the situation of corresponding node on the other network, denoted by the red dashed
lines.
Next, we pay attention to the extended analysis approach. Pair approximation method has proved its efficiency and importance
to qualitatively predict the trends in the traditional spatial game study [8–11]. However, we have extended the single network to
interdependent networks, the method also need to be updated. Since we focus on the evolution of coupled strategies, the name
Strategy-Couple Pair Approximation(SCPA) may be more appropriate on interdependent networks.
Instead of considering different individuals on single network, we mainly deal with the couples containing players on both
networks (see Fig. A2). Thus four types of couples will be found in the system: C-C, C-D, D-C and D-D couples. Notice the
possible existence of spontaneous symmetry breaking phenomenon, the C-D and D-C couples should not be regarded as one
single type. To keep their meanings more straightforward, we give a simple example. For instance, when the node on Network
Up chooses C, and its corresponding one selects D. This case can be denoted by C-D. However, if the node on Network Up is
D and the interdependent one is C, D-C is the correct notation for this situation. In addition, to keep expression simple, C-C,
C-D, D-C and D-D will be represented by 1,2,3 and 4 in the following equations, respectively.
Based on all the above assumptions, when couple I (
[
Iu
Id
]
, representing players on Network Up and Network Down) meets
couple J(
[
Ju
Jd
]
), the strategy adoption process can be written as two following equations,
p(
[
Iu Ju
Id Jd
]
→
[
Ju Ju
Id Jd
]
) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
f(GJu −GIu)
p(X, I)p(Y, I)p(Z, I)p(I, J)p(J, U)p(J, V )p(J,W )
pI3pJ3
=
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
u(I, J), (Aa1)
p(
[
Iu Ju
Id Jd
]
→
[
Iu Ju
Jd Jd
]
) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
f(GJd −GId)
p(X, I)p(Y, I)p(Z, I)p(I, J)p(J, U)p(J, V )p(J,W )
pI3pJ3
=
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
d(I, J), (Aa2)
where p(S, S′) represents the possibility of finding the couples of S and S′, and f is the transition probability (see Eq. (2)). The
sum runs over all the possible types of neighbor couples for focal couple, namely, X , Y , Z for I , and U , V , W for J (see Fig.
A2). To make notations simple in what follows, the sum will be represented by u(I, J) and d(I, J). (Note that the functions
of u and d not only depend on I and J , but also rely on all their neighbor couples, the exact expressions of u(I, J) and d(I, J)
should be u(I, J)|X,Y,Z,U,V,W and d(I, J)|X,Y,Z,U,V,W ). With respect to the individual fitness G, it is not only determined by
his own payoff P , but also by the payoff of his companion P ′ on the other network (see the text for details). While in this
analysis method, the fitness of players belonging to couples I and J will be rewritten as follows,
GIu = (1− α) ∗ PIu + α ∗ PId ,
GId = (1− α) ∗ PId + α ∗ PIu ,
GJu = (1− α) ∗ PJu + α ∗ PJd ,
GJd = (1− α) ∗ PJd + α ∗ PJu . (Aa∗)
∗ Corresponding author: zhenwang0@gmail.com
2FIG. 1: (Color online) Illustration of two interdependent networks, Network Up and Network Down. On each network, the nodes not only
interact with their neighbors, denoted by the black solid lines, but their situations also depend on the the corresponding nodes on the other
network, represented by the red dashed lines. Here, we only consider the case of one-one correspondence between nodes on the networks.
FIG. 2: (Color online) Demonstration of the relevant configurations for traditional pair approximation (a) and strategy-couple pair approxi-
mation (b). In (a), the configuration of nodes will determine the prediction results, since the probability of changing strategy fully depend on
the situation of neighbor nodes on the single network [8]. However, for the interdependent networks (b), the probability of changing strategy
for focal couples (marked by red dashed lines) rely on their neighbor couples (denoted by black dashed lines). That is, X , Y , Z are neighbor
couples for couple I , and U , V , W are neighbor couples for couple J .
If couple J succeeds in impacting couple I , then the probabilities of various couple pairs will also change, which can result
in 16 ordinary differential equations. Consider the symmetry of the equations and sum of the probabilities equalling to 1 (two
elementary conditions for pair approximation method [8–11]), the equations can be reduced as a set of 9 equations:
p˙(1, 1) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e1 + 1)p(1, 3)u(3, 1)− e1p(1, 3)u(1, 3)− e1p(1, 4)u(1, 4) + e1p(2, 3)u(3, 2)] +
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e1 + 1)p(1, 2)d(2, 1)− e1p(1, 2)d(1, 2)− e1p(1, 4)d(1, 4) + e1p(2, 3)d(2, 3)], (Ab1)
3p˙(1, 2) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
(e1 + 1)p(1, 4)u(4, 1) + (e2 + 1)p(2, 3)u(3, 2) + e2p(1, 3)u(3, 1) + e1p(2, 4)u(4, 2)−
− e2p(1, 3)u(1, 3)− e2p(1, 4)u(1, 4)− e1p(2, 3)u(2, 3)− e1p(2, 4)u(2, 4) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e1 + 1)p(1, 2)d(2, 1) + e2p(1, 2)d(2, 1) + e1p(1, 2)d(1, 2)− (e2 + 1)p(1, 2)d(1, 2) +
+ e2p(2, 3)d(2, 3) + e1p(1, 4)d(1, 4)− e2p(1, 4)d(1, 4)− e1p(2, 3)d(2, 3), (Ab2)
p˙(1, 3) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e3 + 1)p(1, 3)u(1, 3)− (e1 + 1)p(1, 3)u(3, 1) + e3p(1, 3)u(3, 1) + e3p(2, 3)u(3, 2) +
+ e1p(1, 3)u(1, 3) + e1p(1, 4)u(1, 4)− e3p(1, 4)u(1, 4)− e1p(2, 3)u(3, 2) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
(e1 + 1)p(1, 4)d(4, 1) + (e3 + 1)p(2, 3)d(2, 3) + e3p(1, 2)d(2, 1) + e1p(3, 4)d(4, 3)−
− e3p(1, 2)d(1, 2)− e3p(1, 4)d(1, 4)− e1p(2, 3)d(3, 2)− e1p(3, 4)d(3, 4), (Ab3)
p˙(1, 4) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e4 + 1)p(1, 4)u(1, 4)− (e1 + 1)p(1, 4)u(4, 1) + e4p(1, 3)u(3, 1) + e4p(2, 3)u(3, 2) +
+ e1p(2, 3)u(2, 3) + e1p(2, 4)u(2, 4)− e4p(1, 3)u(1, 3)− e1p(2, 4)u(4, 2) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e4 + 1)p(1, 4)d(1, 4)− (e1 + 1)p(1, 4)d(4, 1) + e4p(2, 3)d(2, 3) + e4p(1, 2)d(2, 1) +
+ e1p(2, 3)d(3, 2) + e1p(3, 4)d(3, 4)− e4p(1, 2)d(1, 2)− e1p(3, 4)d(4, 3), (Ab4)
p˙(2, 2) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e2 + 1)p(2, 4)u(4, 2)− e2p(2, 3)u(2, 3)− e2p(2, 4)u(2, 4) + e2p(1, 4)u(4, 1)] +
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e2 + 1)p(1, 2)d(1, 2)− e2p(1, 2)d(2, 1)− e2p(2, 3)d(2, 3) + e2p(1, 4)d(1, 4)], (Ab5)
p˙(2, 3) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e3 + 1)p(2, 3)u(2, 3)− (e2 + 1)p(2, 3)u(3, 2) + e3p(2, 4)u(4, 2) + e3p(1, 4)u(4, 1) +
+ e2p(1, 3)u(1, 3) + e2p(1, 4)u(1, 4)− e3p(2, 4)u(2, 4)− e2p(1, 3)u(3, 1) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e3 + 1)p(2, 3)d(2, 3)− (e2 + 1)p(2, 3)d(3, 2) + e3p(1, 2)d(1, 2) + e3p(1, 4)d(1, 4) +
+ e2p(1, 4)d(4, 1) + e2p(3, 4)d(4, 3)− e3p(1, 2)d(2, 1)− e2p(3, 4)d(3, 4), (Ab6)
p˙(2, 4) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e4 + 1)p(2, 4)u(2, 4)− (e2 + 1)p(2, 4)u(4, 2) + e4p(2, 4)u(4, 2) + e4p(1, 4)u(4, 1) +
+ e2p(2, 3)u(2, 3) + e2p(2, 4)u(2, 4)− e4p(2, 3)u(2, 3)− e2p(1, 4)u(4, 1) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
(e4 + 1)p(1, 4)d(1, 4) + (e2 + 1)p(2, 3)d(3, 2) + e4p(1, 2)d(1, 2) + e2p(3, 4)d(3, 4)−
− e4p(1, 2)d(2, 1)− e4p(2, 3)d(2, 3)− e2p(1, 4)d(4, 1)− e2p(3, 4)d(4, 3), (Ab7)
p˙(3, 3) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e3 + 1)p(1, 3)u(1, 3)− e3p(1, 3)u(3, 1)− e3p(2, 3)u(3, 2) + e3p(1, 4)u(1, 4)] +
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
2[(e3 + 1)p(3, 4)d(4, 3)− e3p(2, 3)d(3, 2)− e3p(3, 4)d(3, 4) + e3p(1, 4)d(4, 4)], (Ab8)
4p˙(3, 4) =
∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
(e4 + 1)p(1, 4)u(1, 4) + (e3 + 1)p(2, 3)u(2, 3) + e4p(1, 3)u(1, 3) + e3p(2, 4)u(2, 4)−
− e4p(1, 3)u(3, 1)− e4p(2, 3)u(3, 2)− e3p(1, 4)u(4, 1)− e3p(2, 4)u(4, 2) +∑
X,Y,Z
∑
U,V,W
−(e4 + 1)p(3, 4)d(3, 4)− (e3 + 1)p(3, 4)d(4, 3) + e4p(1, 4)d(4, 1) + e4p(3, 4)d(4, 3) +
+ e3p(2, 3)d(3, 2) + e3p(3, 4)d(3, 4)− e4p(2, 3)d(3, 2)− e3p(1, 4)d(4, 1), (Ab9)
where the variable el(l = 1, 2, 3, 4) represents the number of l couples among X , Y , Z (a more accurate demonstration should
be el(X ,Y ,Z)).
[1] A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert, Science 286, 509 (1999).
[2] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
[3] M.E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E 69, 066133 (2004).
[4] D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, and G. Szabo´, PLOS Comput. Biol. 6, e1000758 (2010).
[5] M. G. Zimmermann, V. Eguı´luz, and M. S. Miguel, Phys. Rev. E 69, 065102(R) (2004).
[6] C. Hauert and M. Doebeli, Nature 428, 643 (2004).
[7] J. Poncela, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, L. M. Florı´a, A. Sa´nchez, and Y. Moreno, PLoS ONE 3, e2449 (2008).
[8] C. Hauert and G. Szabo´, Am. J. Phys. 73, 405 (2005).
[9] Z.-X. Wu and Y.-H. Wang, Phys. Rev. E 75, 041114 (2007).
[10] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[11] X.-J. Chen, F. Fu, and L Wang, Phys. Rev. E 78, 051120 (2008).
